1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION	
3	IN RE: NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-) Docket No. 13 C 9116
4	ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STODENT- ATHLETE CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION,)) Chicago, Illinois) February 3, 2015
5	22.2020,	9:00 o'clock a.m.
6	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - MOTION BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN Z. LEE	
7	APPEARANCES:	
8		WASTING REPAIRS CORDS CHARTES
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(Proceedings had in open court:) 1 13 C 9116, NCAA Student Athlete Concussion 2 THE CLERK: 3 Injury Litigation, for motion hearing. 4 MS. FEGAN: Good morning, your Honor. Elizabeth Fegan 5 for plaintiffs. 6 MR. MESTER: Good morning, your Honor. Mark Mester 7 and Johanna Spellman for the NCAA. 8 MR. BARBAKOFF: Good morning, your Honor. Gregg 9 Barbakoff on behalf of plaintiffs. 10 MR. EDELSON: Good morning, your Honor. Jay Edelson 11 for plaintiff Nichols. 12 MR. SCHARG: Good morning, your Honor. Ari Scharg 13 also on behalf of the plaintiff Nichols. 14 MS. SPELLMAN: Johanna Spellman on behalf of defendant NCAA. 15 16 THE COURT: All right. Good morning. 17 So let's take care of a number of housekeeping matters 18 first. Previously Mr. Jefferson filed a motion asking to be 19 appointed as lead counsel in this case. That's docket No. 127. 20 In docket No. 132 he filed a motion to withdraw that prior 21 motion. So docket No. 132, the motion to withdraw the 22 previously filed motion, is granted. And docket No. 127 will 23 be stricken. 24 This then brings us to the only remaining motion that

is at issue today, which is plaintiff Nichols' renewed motion

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to appoint Jay Edelson as lead counsel of the personal injury class. Why don't I hear from the plaintiffs with regard to the motion.

MS. FEGAN: Your Honor, quite simply, we'd just ask for a briefing schedule. I contacted Mr. Edelson and his group, and we just suggest that we file a written response in seven days, that they reply in seven days, and set a hearing for February 24 so that these issues can be fully heard and we can have a record before the Court. That would be our suggestion.

But quite simply, your Honor, we just think at this point they have the discovery materials. They certainly have things that they can be working on. In the meantime, we are working on the settlement issues. We intend to follow the Court's schedule to get a new motion for preliminary approval before you. And they will also have an opportunity to object to that settlement if they so choose.

THE COURT: Let me ask you the question. I reviewed the renewed motion. And basically, the plaintiff Nichols and Mr. Edelson, the main argument that they make is that the new amended complaint, the third amended complaint, that was filed in January 7, 2015, no longer is stating a claim or seeking any sort of class-wide damages under Rule 23(b)(3). And the -- I looked at the third amended complaint. And I did notice that the complaint does request that a class be certified under

23(b)(3). And yet, the relief section, it seeks certain damages only on an individual basis.

I was wondering at this point in time what plaintiffs' position is with regard to the scope of the class that they seek to represent as part of their third amended complaint.

MS. FEGAN: Your Honor, I think it's no surprise, right, that we have -- or intend to seek class-wide relief for medical monitoring and that we intend to seek and are seeking individual damages for individual plaintiffs both here before this Court and across the country. And I believe that if we set a briefing schedule there are a number of other lawyers who have an intent to file additional personal injury claims that will say that they don't need lead counsel to represent their individual clients but would prefer to continue to seek those claims alone.

So quite simply, we don't intend to seek a class for personal injury, which is why also our -- we think that the best relief that student athletes, current and former, can get from the NCAA is a medical monitoring program that goes for 50 years, that goes back in time and makes sure that we capture those folks who do think that they may have CTE or other claims.

But that being said, your Honor, we don't intend to seek a class of personal injury claimants.

THE COURT: And the concern I have with regard to the

definition of the class and the scope and nature of the class that the named plaintiffs are seeking to represent is precisely that, which is, if they are not part of the class, right, they can't necessarily represent the interests of the class to which they are not a party. And so --

> I like --MS. FEGAN:

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THE COURT: Hold on for a second.

So I'm trying to figure out. So among the various things that I am trying to figure out as part of this case is what obligations under the third amended complaint, what sort of obligations, if any, do the current lead counsel have to those other individual with regard to those types of claims. So that's my main concern.

MS. FEGAN: And, your Honor, this is something that we actually addressed in our original contested motion for class certification because even in that motion, we sought a 50-state core issues class that went for everything except the ultimate pot of damages. And then we sought the medical monitoring class.

And there is a body of Seventh Circuit case law, and we can address this in responding, that really talks about what our job is is to make sure that we're not precluding those plaintiffs in a claim-splitting situation. So there are specific findings that this Court can make because it is -- it is the same class. And I think that there is a difference

between saying that it's not the same class versus the claims that the class members have, and what they're seeking. And it's our job as lead counsel to ensure that there is not a claim-splitting finding that's somehow down the road before another court and say, oh, you could have adjudicated that before Judge Lee.

And so you will find that that actually was part of our full --

THE COURT: I guess, I understand when you say that they are the same class to mean practically speaking when you look at who are the members of either 23(b)(2) class or 23(b)(3) class, they're going to be kind of perhaps the same number of individuals. The class definition is the same.

But for my purposes, right, what I'm still looking at, it makes a difference as to whether or not it's going to be a 23(b)(2) class or 23(b)(3) class, particularly if you're going to try to pursue a 23(b)(2) class and seek a -- seek a release of certain rights. One would characterize that as a right that they might have to pursue litigation at 23(b)(3).

Now, of course, one possible way to deal with this, and I think this is something that practically speaking I don't think really anyone may want, is for me to decide whether a 23(b)(3) class actually exists, right, for the parties to bring that motion and to have it be at issue. And then we can decide once and for all. Because if in fact the 23(b)(3) class is not

viable, as some of the parties have suggested, well, then we can put that issue to rest. And we can then deal with it on strictly 23(b)(2) basis.

But this -- but I understand that there is costs involved with that, and there is -- you know, all of these risks have been kind of considered and taken into consideration by the parties in their mediation. And I certainly have no desire to disrupt that, or I have -- I don't want to kind of -- cause any minimal disruption. But it is something that I have identified as something that's been bothering me since the beginning of the case. And as the case goes on, there are times when I think that I have more clarity on it. And then something like this comes along. And then I wonder, well, perhaps not.

MS. FEGAN: And to your point, your Honor, I think part of what the Court is struggling with is whether by filing the lead motion now we are accelerating an issue that shouldn't be taken up when we file our motion for preliminary approval. I think quite simply they will have the opportunity to respond whether we are seeking a (b)(3) class, whether there is a class waiver, at that point in time.

But what -- I think part of what we're all struggling with is by accelerating the lead motion when they don't have a motion for class certification on file with respect to PI claim, that we're trying to accelerate the chicken and the egg

question.

So perhaps the right thing to do is to do this on the same schedule that we're seeking preliminary approval on. And that might be a way to handle it. But certainly there is nothing precluding Mr. Edelson from filing a motion for class certification of a personal injury class if he believes it's viable. He has the discovery, and has had it for some time now.

But we are kind of -- we are kind of accelerating an issue in the context of a lead counsel motion, and I think that that's just an inappropriate way to do it, unless they have different motives.

MR. EDELSON: Your Honor, if I can respond?

THE COURT: Briefly, Mr. Edelson.

MR. EDELSON: Yeah, we -- we cannot file a motion for class certification because you appointed Hagens Berman and Joe Siprut lead of this case, which included the personal injury claims. If -- if everybody agrees that we are allowed to move forward on the personal injury claims, then we are happy to do that.

THE COURT: Well, let's do this. Let's take it one step at a time. Okay? So with regard to the proposed briefing schedule, those dates are fine. So the plaintiffs' response will be due in seven days, any replies seven days thereafter. And we can go ahead and set this for status.

Carmen, what does February 24 look like, later in the morning?

THE CLERK: 11:00 o'clock?

THE COURT: That's fine. So we will set it for 11:00.

I feel like in some ways I might be beating a dead horse. You know, I think the parties know kind of my concerns with regard to -- right? One of my paramount duties as a Judge in overseeing a class settlement is to make sure that all the putative class members, that their interests are represented adequately in this case. And it is from that concern that all these discussions about Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) come up. Frankly also where the concerns with regard to notice come up, right? Because arguably the notice, scope of notices, required under 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(2) are different.

So it does raise a number of issues. I think that 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3) debate is basically a manifestation of the -- or the arena in which the parties can discuss whether or not the class that the plaintiff is seeking to certify would be adequately represented in this case. And so, you know, I think that it's no surprise that that's kind of my main concern, obviously adequate representation and then fairness with regard to the substance of the settlement.

So hopefully the parties can address that in their briefs. And if I have any further questions, I will ask the parties those questions on February 24.

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